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I. INTRODUCTION
We often concentrate our legal reform efforts against racism in the socalled substantive law1 and neglect procedural regulations such as
evidentiary rules which surreptitiously bond white supremacy. Seldom do
people think about how our probative rules privilege whiteness and
penalize nonwhiteness. Most people, if confronted with the racist nature
of our evidentiary system, 2 would be as surprised as Oprah appeared
during her March 7, 2021 interview with Meghan Markle when she
supposedly learned that the British Royal Family is racist. 3
1. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial
Insults, Epithets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 133 (1982); L.
Song Richardson, Phillip Atiba Goff, Implicit Racial Bias in Public Defender
Triage, 122 YALE L.J. 2626 (2013); Atiba R. Ellis, Race, Class, and Structural
Discrimination: On Vulnerability Within the Political Process, 28 J. CIV. RTS. &
ECON. DEV. 33 (2015); Rose Cuison Villazor, Problematizing the Protection of
Culture and the Insular Cases, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 127 (2018); Michael
Gentithes, Suspicionless Witness Stops: The New Racial Profiling, 55 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 491 (2020); Jonathan Weinberg, The Racial Roots of the
Federal Administrative State, ADMIN. & REG. L. NEWS, Summer 2020, at 15;
Richard Thompson Ford, Affirmative-Action Jurisprudence Reflects American
Racial Animosity but Is Also Unhappy in Its Own Special Way, 10/30/2020 U.
CHI. L. REV. ONLINE 110 (2020); Sara Tofighbakhsh, , Racial Gerrymandering
After Rucho v. Common Cause: Untangling Race and Party, 120 COLUM. L. REV.
1885 (2020).
2. Throughout the paper, the terms evidentiary and probative system refer
to the rules of evidence, the case law interpreting them, as well as the unregulated
forensic practices of all legal operators (i.e., judges, attorneys, and jurors).
3. During the interview about Meghan Markle’s time as a senior member of
the British Royal Family, Oprah asked the Duchess of Sussex about the reason
behind the Crown not bestowing to Archie (her first-born with Prince Harry) a
title. Although the official explanation for Prince Harry’s son not to have a royal
title is a letter from George V that declared that the great-grandchildren of the
monarch would no longer be princes or princesses, except for the eldest son of the
eldest son of the Prince of Wales, Caroline Davies, Was Meghan's Son Archie
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Oprah’s viral reaction, which has been turned into all sorts of memes, 4
epitomizes our understanding of racial injustice within our evidentiary
system. Like Oprah, most of us are so accustomed to performing whiteness
in white spaces (e.g., mainstream media, academia, and the courts) that we
forget it is indeed a performance. As a result, we end up believing in the
myth that the system is racially neutral just as Oprah seems to have
believed that the current British Crown could not be blatantly racist.
However, just like The New Yorker writer Professor Jelani Cobb tweeted
about Oprah’s and the public reaction to Markle´s interview, “[w]e can’t
be shocked that the crown that presided over a global colonial slave system
might be a wee bit racist . . . .” 5 Likewise, we cannot be shocked that a
Denied the Title 'Prince' Because He's Mixed Race, THE GUARDIAN (March 8,
2021), https://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2021/mar/08/why-meghan-harryson-archie-denied-title-prince-mixed-race [https://perma.cc/6UAF-VFNF]. Markle
hinted there were race considerations in the decision to follow strictly the royal
decree and not even offer security to the newborn royal, Sun Reporter, MARK MY
WORDS Meghan Markle Oprah Interview: Read the Full Transcript of Duchess
and Prince Harry’s Bombshell Confessions, THE SUN (Mar 8, 2021) (Updated,
Mar 9, 2021), https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/14277841/meghan-markle-oprahinterview-full-transcript/ [https://perma.cc/BRT5-PX2H]. The puzzling exchange
in which Oprah’s question sought an alternative discriminatory reason for the
decision but ended up with an overly surprised Oprah when Markle’s answer so
explicitly described the racism of the Crown is reproduced below.
Oprah: Why do you think that is? Do you think it’s because of his
race?
Meghan: (Sighs)
Oprah: And I know that’s a loaded question, but. . .
Meghan: But I can give you an honest answer. In those
months when I was pregnant, all around this same time. . . so
we have in tandem the conversation of “He won’t be given
security, he’s not going to be given a title” and also concerns
and conversations about how dark his skin might be when
he’s born.
Id.
Oprah responded surprised by uttering “What? . . . Who. . . who is having that
conversation with you? . . . There is a conversation. . . Hold on. Hold up. Hold up.
Stop right now.” Id.
4. Elizabeth Logan, Oprah Winfrey Has Seen Those Memes From the
Meghan and Harry Interview Thanks to Ava DuVernay!, GLAMOUR (March 15,
2021), https://www.glamour.com/story/oprah-winfrey-has-seen-those-memes-fr
om-the-meghan-and-harry-interview [ttps://perma.cc/EKP8-636T].
5. Jelani Cobb (@jelani9), TWITTER (March 7, 2021, 9:42 P.M.),
https://twitter.com/jelani9/status/1368738974500585474
[https://perma.cc/G88N-SD7F].
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system built on racism and misogyny 6 is still a wee bit of a white
supremacist tool.
In this essay, I will argue, using a Critical Race Theory (CRT) lens, 7
that despite the race neutrality of the rules of evidence, our legal probative
system facilitates the admissibility of racialized evidence which obscures
its truth-finding goals and adversely affects people of color (POC). I will
first discuss the historical roots of our current racialized evidence practices
and proffer an analytical framework to unmask white supremacy in our
evidentiary system. In the sections that follow, I will identify using the
three core principles of the proposed CRT framework (credibility
injustice, white normativity and transparency, and contestation of
racialized evidence and its backlash) how racialized evidence is admitted
in trials and entry points for possible reforms. To show the
interdependency of societal norms and rules of evidence, I discuss how
these racialized evidentiary practices are present in everyday interactions
by looking at the fallout between the Duchess of Sussex and the British

6. Regarding the misogynist history and practice of the evidence system see
generally, Aníbal Rosario Lebrón, Evidence’s #MeToo Moment, 74 U. MIAMI L.
REV. 1 (2019) (unfolding how the credibility discounting of victims of gender and
sex based violence that is premised on patriarchal and heteronormative notions is
reinforced by our evidentiary system through the use of character for
untruthfulness evidence); Julia Simon-Kerr, Note, Unchaste and Incredible: The
Use of Gendered Conceptions of Honor in Impeachment, 117 YALE L.J. 1854
(2008) [hereinafter Simon-Kerr, Unchaste and Incredible] (discussing how the
association between chastity and credibility has remained in our evidence system
as courts continued to insist that a victim's sexual history has some relevancy to
credibility and in the treatment of moral turpitude law and prostitution as bearing
on the credibility of a witness); Julia Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy, 85 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 152 (2017) [hereinafter Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy]
(arguing how the purpose of impeachment rules is in reality to identify which
people “have the culturally recognized moral integrity or honor to be worthy of
belief in court”).
7. As Professor Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw has explained CRT
is a way of seeing, attending to, accounting for, tracing and
analyzing the ways that race is produced, the ways that racial
inequality is facilitated, and the ways that our history has created
these inequalities that now can be almost effortlessly
reproduced unless we attend to the existence of these
inequalities.
Jacey Fortin, Critical Race Theory: A Brief History, N.Y. TIMES, (July 27, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/article/what-is-critical-race-theory.html. [https://perm
a.cc/7ZZ4-X9V8].
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Crown. Finally, I offer some viable solutions to be studied further in the
future.
II. EVIDENCE THROUGH A CRT LENS
The United States evidentiary system was built on white-competency
rules. 8 In other words, white people were deemed competent to testify
while POC were not. Consequently, Blacks and other POC were barred
from participating as witnesses in judicial proceedings. 9 In certain periods
and jurisdictions (e.g., during slavery), it was a complete bar. 10 In others,
it was a partial bar that included the inability to testify against and,
sometimes even, in favor of a white person but not necessarily against
other non-white people. 11 A system that promoted this discount of POC’s
credibility in the courts cannot suddenly become racially just or neutral
simply because those blatantly racist rules were abolished.
This system, predicated on the privilege of white narratives and the
dehumanization and exploitation of non-white people, fostered, and
amplified racial injustice beyond the courts. In its symbiotic relationship
with societal norms, the white competency rules have aided in the
normalization of society’s discounting of non-white voices; made white
bodies, stories, and culture the standard; and entrenched racialized notions
about credibility and proof. This normalization enables the everyday reintroduction of racial prejudices in court through the evidentiary practices
of legal actors (i.e., judges, attorneys, jurors, witnesses, and parties) even
though white competency rules have long been abolished. As Professor
Jasmine Gonzales Rose has noted, “[d]espite honorable intentions,
evidence law is too often employed (or ignored) in ways that replicate and
perpetuate the racial injustice prevalent in our society.”12 White
supremacy remains present in every aspect of the legal process, even in
8. Thomas D. Morris, Slaves and the Rules of Evidence in Criminal Trials Symposium on the Law of Slavery: Criminal and Civil Law of Slavery, 68 CHI.KENT L. REV. 1209, 1209-11 (1993); Amanda Carlin, Comment, The Courtroom
as White Space: Racial Performance as Noncredibility, 63 UCLA L. REV. 450,
454-58 (2016); Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, Toward a Critical Race Theory of
Evidence, 101 MINN. L. REV. 2243, 2245-48 (2017) [hereinafter Gonzales Rose,
Toward a CRT Theory of Evidence].
9. Morris, supra note 8 at 1209; Carlin, supra note 8 at 454-55; Gonzales
Rose, Toward a CRT Theory of Evidence, supra note 8 at 2245-46.
10. Id.
11. Morris, supra note 8 at 1210-11; Carlin, supra note 8 at 455-58; Gonzales
Rose, Toward a CRT Theory of Evidence, supra note 8 at 2246-48.
12. Gonzales Rose, Toward a CRT Theory of Evidence, supra note 8 at 2302.
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ways that are still imperceptible for those of us who are aware of its racist
history.
To dissect this symbiosis between rules of evidence and societal
norms, I will use a CRT lens. Using this lens, I have designated three main
categories or motifs of evidentiary racial injustice that can help us unmask
white supremacy in our probative system. These three motifs are (1)
credibility injustice, (2) white normativity and transparency, and (3)
contestation of racialized evidence and its backlash. 13 The first motif
examines how evidence rules and our probative practices preserve white
supremacy by bestowing upon white actors a credibility surplus and POC
a credibility deficit. The motif of white normativity and transparency, on
the other hand, explains how evidentiary standards are based on a white
worldview that leads legal operators to adjudicate facts along racialized
lines without the whiteness of this practice being questioned or made
visible. The third motif, the contestation of racialized evidence and its
backlash, accounts for what happens when legal players challenge
racialized evidence and attempt to introduce nonwhite narratives as truth.
These motifs are found scattered in the work of evidence scholars who
have explored entrenched racist practices in stand-your-ground defenses, 14
impeachment by prior convictions, 15 flight from racially targeted police

13. Professor Gonzales Rose has proposed a similar analytical framework
based on CRT. She designates her framework as the seven P’s of Critical Race
Theory (CRT) inquiry. Id. at 2249. The seven P’s of her framework are the
following: (1) the power behind racialization, (2) the purpose of racism, (3) the
property of whiteness, (4) privilege, (5) the pervasiveness of racism, (6) the
permanence of racism, and (7) the perspectives of people of color. Id. The first
three P’s (the power behind racialization, the purpose of racism, and the property
of whiteness) correspond with the motif of credibility injustice that invites us to
examine how the rules are “applied to preserve existing racial power structures”
through credibility imbalances. Id. at 2250-51, 2254-55. The next three P’s
(privilege, the pervasiveness of racism, and the permanence of racism) help us
identify how white normativity becomes the prevailing worldview without its
whiteness being questioned and they correspond with the second motif of white
normativity and transparency. Id. at 2252, 2255-57. Last, the seventh P, the
perspectives of people of color, show how nonwhite narratives are introduced in
the judicial process and validated as forms of truth and evidence and it
corresponds with the last motif that explores the contestation of racialized
evidence practices and its backlash. Id. at 2258.
14. Id. at 2261-68.
15. Montré D. Carodine, "the Mis-Characterization of the Negro": A Race
Critique of the Prior Conviction Impeachment Rule, 84 IND. L.J. 521 (2009).
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profiling, 16
cross-racial
witness
identifications,17
jury
18
disenfranchisement, and unregulated or functional evidence. 19 In this
article, I analyze instead these motifs systematically to identify places for
reform in our probative system that will promote racial justice.
I propose looking at the motifs through the following points of entry:
(1) Precipitating Incident or Investigative Stage (accounts of the events
and the litigants);20 (2) Jury Selection (understood beyond how racially
representative juries are); (3) Evidence Presentation (including all types of
evidence, not just testimonial); (4) Credibility Impeachments; (5)
Functional Evidence (evidence that is not regulated but used by jurors such
as gender, class, race, idiolect, and clothing);21 (6) Judge’s Rulings; (7)
Attorneys’ Arguments (not only during statements to the jury but also
while discussing objections or other legal matters such as voir dire); (8)
Triers of Fact’s Adjudications (jury deliberations and judges’
determinations of facts); and (9) Post-Trial Remedies. 22 Taking this
approach will facilitate determining what remedial reforms would be more
effective and how they should be accomplished. However, any legal
16. Gonzales Rose, Toward a CRT Theory of Evidence, supra note 8 at 226988; Kristin Henning, The Reasonable Black Child: Race, Adolescence, and the
Fourth Amendment, 67 AM. U. L. REV. 1513 (2018).
17. Gonzales Rose, Toward a CRT Theory of Evidence, supra note 8 at 228998; Taki V. Flevaris & Ellie F. Chapman, Cross-Racial Misidentification: A Call
to Action in Washington State and Beyond, 38 Seattle U. L. REV. 861 (2015); Peter
Petraro, The Admissibility of Expert Psychological Testimony on the Unreliability
of Cross-Racial Identifications, 47 No. 5 CRIM. LAW BULLETIN ART 1 (2011);
Aaron H. Chiu, Comment, "We Can't Tell Them Apart": When and How the Court
Should Educate Jurors on the Potential Inaccuracies of Cross-Racial
Identifications, 7 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS 415 (2007).
18. Jasmine B. Gonzales Rose, Color-Blind but Not Color-Deaf: Accent
Discrimination in Jury Selection, 44 N.Y.U. L & SOC. CHANGE 309 (2020).
19. Bennett Capers, Evidence Without Rules, 94 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 867
(2018).
20. The reason to include pre-litigation events in an evidentiary reform will
become clearer when the paper discusses in tandem the motifs and access points.
But suffice to say that it is in part connected to the white competency rules and
how testimonies and narratives are developed during the precipitating event and
how they can be later used during a trial.
21. Capers, supra note 19 at 871.
22. This list is not meant to be exhaustive. There might be more points of
entry, but I consider these the backbone of the evidentiary system. I will not use
all these entry points in the analysis in this essay, but it is worth including them
to provide readers with various points of reference to think more about the
arguments being raised in the article.
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reforms that come from using this analytical tool should be executed in
tandem with complementary efforts to eradicate racism at large. Legal
reforms without a corresponding substantial social change will not fully
subvert white supremacy as racial injustice practices will still percolate
throughout the system.23
III. ADMITTING RACE INTO EVIDENCE
The aforementioned motifs are not only observed in our evidence rules
and practices but can also be identified in Meghan Markle’s interview with
Oprah. In this section, I will discuss these motifs as they are manifested in
the various access points previously identified alongside how they can be
observed in Markle’s interview and public reactions to it. With this
rhetoric device, I hope to show the interdependency between evidence
rules and societal norms. Specifically, I intend to show how they feed on
each other long after the history of their relationship has been obscured by
limited legal reforms.
A. Credibility Injustice
The first motif, credibility injustice, ultimately traces back to the
indelible history of white competency rules. These rules served to socially
fix testimonial injustice, a phenomenon that occurs when an individual or
group experiences either a credibility surplus or a credibility deficit based
on prejudice.24 The practice of white competency rules created a
credibility deficit for POC while bestowing upon white people a credibility
surplus. In other words, witnesses are less trusted because of their race
23. The public education system is the best example of the perils of
attempting to subvert white supremacy only through legal reforms. The United
States education system remains, even after Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954), segregated and racially unjust. Nancy A. Denton, The
Persistence of Segregation: Links Between Residential Segregation and School
Segregation, 80 MINN. L. REV. 795 (1996); Gary Orfield & Erica Frankenberg,
Increasingly Segregated and Unequal Schools as Courts Reverse Policy,
EDUCATIONAL ADMINISTRATION QUARTERLY 2014, VOL. 50(5) 718–734 (2014).
Part of the stagnation in racial equality in education is due to the persistence of
racist practices and ideas that were present when Brown was decided. As Kiri
Davis’ documentary shows by recreating the famous doll experiment of the 1940's
by psychologist Dr. Kenneth Clark that served to pave the way to decision in
Brown. 4 Truth and Justice, Kiri Davis: A Girl Like Me (2005), YOUTUBE (April
16, 2007) https://youtu.be/z0BxFRu_SOw [https://perma.cc/X86Q-QQRZ].
24. Miranda Fricker, EPISTEMIC INJUSTICE: POWER AND THE ETHICS OF
KNOWING 17 ( 1st ed. 2007).
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while others experienced the exact opposite for being white. This
credibility imbalance is so entrenched that the competency rules are no
longer needed to preserve white supremacy. Thus, the abolition of white
competency rules has done nothing to correct credibility injustice. Triers
of fact continue to make the same credibility adjudications they used to
make when the white competency rules still existed.
1. A Duchess’ Credibility Deficit
A good example of this dynamic is seen in the manner the Crown
managed the controversies surrounding Markle’s interview. Queen
Elizabeth II took advantage of this credibility imbalance to deflect racist
accusations against the Royal Family. Several days after Oprah’s
interview, the Crown put out the following statement:
The issues raised, particularly that of race, are concerning. While
some recollections may vary, they are taken very seriously and
will be addressed by the family privately.25
This statement cunningly deflects the charge of racism by turning it
into a matter of conflicting testimony. The strategy is to bank on the
testimonial surplus of the Queen and Markle’s deficit by planting the seed
about diverging recollections. If recollections vary it is because at least
one of the declarants is lying. With that implication, the Crown subtly
attests that, despite the Crown’s history of colonialism, the Black woman
(Markle), 26 not the white person (the Queen), must be the one mistaken,
the one lying. The statement only works as damage control if the Crown
were counting on the public to be guided by this testimonial imbalance.
Accordingly, no matter how common and plausible Markle’s account of
what it is like to be mixed-race or the first POC in a predominantly white

25. Buckingham Palace statement on Harry and Meghan interview, AP
NEWS, (March 9, 2021), https://apnews.com/article/buckingham-palacestatement-harry-meghan-oprah-interview-0a3c32ab79f800c54c346fe82a2e8404
[https://perma.cc/CHT8-C8RM].
26. Lisa A. Crooms, Speaking Partial Truths and Preserving Power:
Deconstructing White Supremacy, Patriarchy, and the Rape Corroboration Rule
in the Interest of Black Liberation, 40 HOW. L.J. 459, 474–75 (1997) (discussing
the credibility discount of black women in rape cases); Julia Simon-Kerr,
Credibility by Proxy, supra note 6 at 190–92, 200–01 (discussing how
impeachment rules enforce cultural conceptions of who is worthy of belief in the
context of race and gender).
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group, 27 the Crown encouraged the public to discount Markle’s account
by tapping into the long history of testimonial injustice.
2. Investigating Credibility Injustice
Credibility injustice has been well documented during trials. 28 Yet,
trials are not the only place we should look if we are trying to understand
how testimonial imbalances contribute to the admissibility of racialized
evidence. If we analyze the credibility injustice motif from the access point
of the precipitating incident, we will understand how POC’s credibility
deficit is perpetuated by the Rules of Evidence in impeachment with
previous acts of untruthfulness and prior convictions, hearsay exceptions,
and expert evidence.
a. False Rape Allegations
Testimonial injustice has been well documented along both race and
gender lines during trials. 29 For example, women enjoy a credibility
surplus in cases that involve rape accusations against men of color.30
Consider, the Scottsboro Boys and the Central Park Five cases, both of
27. See Martin Michaels, Interracial Relationships Still Subject to
Discrimination, MINT PRESS NEWS (Sept. 6, 2013), http://www.mintpress
news.com/interracial-relationships-still-subject-todiscrimination/168463 [https://
perma.cc/V2CF-2WRV] (discussing how although interracial couples are be
becoming much more common discrimination continues to follow interracial
families); Elizabeth M. Toledo, Note, When Loving Is Not Enough, 104 CAL. L.
REV. 769, 790 (2016) (examining how interracial couples are still discriminated);
Good Morning Britain, Piers and Alex Clash Over Prince Harry and Meghan’s
Accusations of Racism | Good Morning Britain, YOUTUBE (March 9, 2021)
https://youtu.be/sG9rX6Ifzhw [https://perma.cc/3UE3-R3NM] (Alex Beresford
discussing his experience in an interracial family).
28. Rosario Lebrón, supra note 6; Simon-Kerr, Unchaste and Incredible,
supra note 6; Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy supra note 6.
29. Rosario Lebrón, supra note 6; Simon-Kerr, Unchaste and Incredible,
supra note 8; Simon-Kerr, Credibility by Proxy supra note 6.
30. In no way should this discussion be understood as implying that men of
color do not sexually assault women. As Tarana Burke has stated, “We have to be
able to hold two truths at the same time or more than one truth.” The Daily Show
with Trevor Noah, Tarana Burke on What Me Too Is Really About - Extended
Interview | The Daily Show, YouTube (June 4, 2018), https://youtu.be/GfJ3
bIAQOKg [https://perma.cc/M95N-XRSN] (speaking on the true history of Black
men being falsely accused and the fact that Black men commit sexual violence
against women, especially Black women).
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which involved false accusations of Black teenagers gang-raping white
victims. 31 In both cases, the officers discarded the defendants’ stories of
innocence because of their credibility deficit due to their race. This deficit
was enhanced by the myth that men of color (especially Black men) are
“animalistic, sexually unrestrained, inherently criminal, and ultimately
bent on rape.” 32 This myth was created to promote white supremacy based
on superior morality and intellect as well as on credibility imbalances.
This credibility injustice and perceived superiority lead to racialized
evidentiary practices not only at trial but from the very beginning of the
investigation. For instance, in the case of the Scottsboro Boys, the race
credibility deficit trumped the victims’ gender credibility deficit. Because
of this, the women experienced a surplus that led investigators to believe
them even when there were reasons to doubt their testimony. 33 In this way,
POC defendants get into court based largely on their credibility deficit.
This deficit widens during the trial if the defendant decides to testify to
prove his innocence. Due to impeachment rules that allow attorneys to
bring prior instances of untruthful behavior 34 that are not relevant and have
been shown to not be predictors of truthful testimony, 35 prosecutors can
31. Sharon L. Davies, The Reality of False Confessions - Lessons of the
Central Park Jogger Case, 30 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 209, 211-12
(2006); N. Jeremi Duru, The Central Park Five, the Scottsboro Boys, and the Myth
of the Bestial Black Man, 25 CARDOZO L. REV. 1315, 1316-17 (2004); Faust
Rossi, The Scottsboro Trials: A Legal Lynching, CORNELL LAW FACULTY
PUBLICATIONS PAPER 948, 1, 1-5 (2002), http://scholarship.law.cornell
.edu/facpub/948 [https://perma.cc/3SPK-AMEM]; Douglas O. Linder, THE
TRIALS OF “THE SCOTTSBORO BOYS,” http://law2.umkc.edu/faculty/projects
/FTrials/scottsboro/SB_acct.html [https://perma.cc/F4M5-DEUE]. In the case of
the Scottsboro Boys’ accusation, the alleged gang rape of two white girls by nine
black teenagers was denounced by the alleged victims. Rossi, supra. In the case
of the Central Park Five, it was the police who decided about who the rapists of
the Central Park jogger were. Duru, supra; Davies, supra. Both cases, however,
illustrate how race plays a role in credibility determinations not only in a trial but
since the investigation stage, which has important consequences in the
admissibility of evidence.
32. Duru, supra note 31 at 1320.
33. Rossi, supra note 31 at 1-5.
34. For example, a witness can be impeached with evidence of their character
for untruthfulness through reputation or opinion testimony, prior specific act, and
prior criminal acts. See, e.g., FED. R. EVID. 608-609.
35. Carodine, supra note 15 at 553-59; Rosario Lebrón, supra note 6 at 6063; Donald H. Zeigler, Harmonizing Rules 609 and 608(b) of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, 2003 UTAH L. REV. 635, 646–47 (2003) Charles H. Kanter &
Richard Page, Impeaching and Rehabilitating a Witness with Character
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further build on the credibility deficit until they completely discredit
defendants. Defendants, aware of this sometimes, resign themselves to
their fate.
For example, in the case of the Central Park Five, the credibility
injustice led to false and forced police confessions. 36 Some of the
teenagers admitted to the rape itself, while others admitted to some
involvement in the crime.37 In addition to the coercive techniques
(including mental and physical abuse) used to induce these confessions, 38
a reason these teenagers falsely admitted to criminal activity is likely that
they were well aware of the fact that nobody would believe in their
innocence due to their credibility deficit. 39
The Central Park Five’s confessions proved extremely damning even
though the evidence indicated that the rape was committed by only one
person. 40 Confessions have lasting evidentiary effects. Besides factfinders
generally regarding confessions to be dispositive, even when they are
coerced or conflict with the rest of the evidence, not much can be done
under the Rules of Evidence once one has been produced.
Confessions enter evidence under hearsay rules. 41 If a defendant
decides to testify to explain why he confessed falsely, he admits to a
previous act of untruthfulness. This self-impeaching admission will only
fuel the factfinders’ credibility biases and give opposing attorneys ample
ammunition for cross-examination and closing arguments to further
obscure a bad, racialized investigation. All of this is prejudicial enough for
Evidence: Reputation, Opinion, Specific Acts and Prior Convictions, 9 U.C.D. L.
REV. 319, 324 (1976).
36. Duru, supra note 32 at 1316-17; Davies, supra note 31 at 215-16.
37. Duru, supra note 32 at 1316-17; Davies, supra note 31 at 215-16.
38. Davies, supra note 32 at 218.
39. Many victims of sexual assault exhibit the same kind of resignation. They
assume that they are not going to be believed and their credibility is going to be
put on trial. For that reason, they decline to proceed with accusations against their
aggressors to prevent further revictimization by not being believed. Tom Lininger,
Bearing the Cross, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1353, 1359-60 (2005); Diana Friedland,
27 Years of “Truth-in-Evidence”: The Expectations and Consequences of
Proposition 8’s Most Controversial Provision, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 1, 27
(2009); Deborah Tuerkheimer, Incredible Women: Sexual Violence and the
Credibility Discount, 166 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 28 (2017); Rosario Lebrón, supra note
6 at 51.
40. Duru, supra note 32 at 1318-19.
41. Confessions would be admitted under the party opponent hearsay
exception. For example, Rule 801 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The exception
covers the party’s own statements or any statements that were authorized or
adopted by the party as well as some certain statements made by a co-conspirator.
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defendants without previous convictions. 42 It is even worse for defendants
who do have previous convictions, which many American male POC have
solely because of racialized mass incarceration, as it skews their
testimonial deficit even further.43
b. False 9-1-1 Accusations
The same issues of malicious accusations predicated on race, absence
of pre-trial checkpoints for excluding racialized evidence, and lack of rules
to contextualize or impeach racialized evidence during a trial occur in nonsexual-violence cases (e.g., harassment, nuisances, child abuse, and child
neglect cases). The recent Central Park birdwatching incident, which
involved a confrontation between a white woman (Amy Cooper) and a
Black man (Christian Cooper) exemplifies well these probative issues that
credibility imbalances create even from investigative stages that are not
corrected but accentuated during a trial. 44
Amy was walking her unleashed dog. 45 Christian, who was
birdwatching, politely asked Amy to comply with the law and leash her
dog. When Amy refused, Christian tried to leash the dog himself, at which
point Amy yelled, "Don't you touch my dog!" and threatened to call the
police and tell them that an African American man was threatening her. 46
When Christian insisted on her complying with the law, she placed a call
to 9-1-1, pretending to be scared, and delivering on her previous threat of
alleging that Christian was threatening her life.47 Fortunately, Christian
42. Prior convictions are a subset of previous or specific acts of
untruthfulness use to impeach the credibility of a witness. Depending on the
jurisdiction, it might be automatically admissible, include more than crime in
falsi, or differ on how long a conviction is acceptable for impeachment or whether
it is subject to an unfair prejudice analysis. Zeigler, supra note 35 at 646-47.
43. Carodine, supra note 15 at 525.
44. Amir Vera & Laura Ly, White Woman Who Called Police on a Black
Man Bird-Watching in Central Park Has Been Fired, CNN (May 26, 2020),
https://edition.cnn.com/2020/05/26/us/central-park-video-dog-video-african-am
erican-trnd/index.html [https://perma.cc/L3SM-88LG].
45. Id.
46. Good Morning America Woman Sentenced to Community Service After
Lie about Central Park Attack (Oct. 15, 2020), https://youtu.be/4ib1U3iNwsQ
[https://perma.cc/NU5W-9DWW].
47. Matthew Impelli, NYC Mayor Condemns White Woman Calling Cops on
Black Man in Central Park as “Racism, Plain and Simple,” NEWSWEEK (May 26,
2020), https://www.newsweek.com/nyc-mayor-condemns-white-woman-callingcops-black-man-central-park-racism-plain-simple-1506516 [https://perma.cc/N2
ZC-EDA3].
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recorded the event with his cellphone. Nonetheless, Amy placed a second
call alleging that he tried to assault her when Christian was not recording.
Christian’s recording was dispositive evidence showing how Amy
was relying on her credibility surplus as a white woman relative to his
credibility deficit as a Black man. 48 Had there been no video, given this
credibility imbalance, the police probably would have at least arrested
Christian, if not brutalized or killed him. 49
Because of the recording, Amy was eventually charged with false
reporting, 50 but prosecutors dismissed the charge after she completed a
therapeutic program consisting of five sessions on instruction about racial
biases. 51 Ironically, no one thought Amy needed racial-bias training, given
that she was well aware of them and how to exploit them in the legal
system. As radio commentator and equity advocate, Adrienne Lawrence
tweeted, “Her malicious weaponization of racial bias proves that she’s
well-aware of it and knows how it works. She needed punishment, not
coddling.”52

48. Id.
49. To Name a Few of the Most Recent Victims: Eric Garner, Atatiana
Jefferson, Aura Rosser, Michael Brown, Tamir Rice, Philando Castile, Breonna
Taylor, and George Floyd. Alia Chughtai, Know Their Names Black People
Killed by the Police in the US, AL JAZEERA, https://interactive.aljazeera
.com/aje/2020/know-their-names/index.html
[https://perma.cc/L8X6-PKVH];
George Floyd: Timeline of black deaths and protests, BBC NEWS (April 22,
2021), https://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-52905408 [https://perma.cc/
B5S4-PPAZ].
50. Jonah E. Bromwich, Amy Cooper, Who Falsely Accused Black BirdWatcher, Has Charge Dismissed, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 16, 2021), https://www
.nytimes.com/2021/02/16/nyregion/amy-cooper-charges-dismissed.html [https://
perma.cc/X2JX-797C].
51. Id. The discussion about the state’s improper response to Amy Cooper’s
case is not a commentary on the desirability of implementing restorative justice
responses in this type of case. Bringing restorative justice in cases of racial harms
could have great benefits. See, e.g., Johanna Turner, Race, Gender and
Restorative Justice: Ten Gifts of a Critical Race Feminist Approach, 23 RICH.
PUB. INT. L. REV. 267 (2020) (discussing the value of critical race feminist
restorative justice as an alternative response to sexual and racial harms). However,
five sessions on instruction bias are not restorative justice. There is no engagement
with the victim and recognizing the harms made to him, there is also no change
in racial views after five therapy or instruction sessions.
52. Adrienne Lawrence (@AdrienneLaw), TWITTER (Feb. 16, 2021, 1:08
P.M.), https://twitter.com/AdrienneLaw/status/1361724217952137216 [https://
perma.cc/RP5V-5AQH].
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Beyond the lack of consequences and the frequent slaps on the wrist
that white litigants and self-designated victims receive for making false
accusations and introducing racialized evidence in court, the Central Park
birdwatching incident exposes the lack of checkpoints in our system for
this type of evidence. If it were not for Christian’s video, Amy’s
statements would enjoy the protection of hearsay exception rules such as
present sense impression, 53 excited utterance, 54 and then-existing mental,
emotional, or physical condition. 55 And if Amy’s statements had been,
unlike, in this case, non-testimonial 56—for example, if Amy had recorded
herself and uploaded the recording to her social media—then, under
Crawford57 and its progeny, 58 they would have been admissible even if
Amy had been unavailable to testify or unwilling to cooperate, 59 and even
though the evidence would not have satisfied a minimum threshold of
reliability. 60 More importantly, defense attorneys would not have been
able to exclude this racialized evidence unless they could have met the

53. “A statement describing or explaining an event or condition, made while
or immediately after the declarant perceived it.” FED. R. EVID. 803 (1).
54. “A statement relating to a startling event or condition, made while the
declarant was under the stress of excitement that it caused.” Id.
55. A statement of the declarant’s then-existing state of mind
(such as motive, intent, or plan) or emotional, sensory, or
physical condition (such as mental feeling, pain, or bodily
health), but not including a statement of memory or belief to
prove the fact remembered or believed unless it relates to the
validity or terms of the declarant’s will. Id.
56. A non-testimonial statement is one “procured with a primary purpose of
creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony.” Ohio v. Clark, 576 U.S.
237, 245 (2015).
57. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (reformulating the
admissibility standard for hearsay statements in criminal cases by holding that,
under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment, prior testimonial
statements of witnesses who have since become unavailable may not be admitted
without cross-examination).
58. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813 (2006); Melendez-Diaz v.
Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009); Michigan v. Bryant, 562 U.S. 344 (2011);
Bullcoming v. New Mexico, 564 U.S. 647 (2011); Clark, 576 U.S. at 245.
59. Jeffrey Bellin, Applying Crawford's Confrontation Right in A Digital
Age, 45 TEX. TECH L. REV. 33, 34 (2012) (explaining how “few electronic
utterances appear to fall within the Court's definition of ‘testimonial.’”).
60. Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 420 (2007) (explaining how after
Crawford the Confrontation Clause does not require the exclusion of nontestimonial statements even if they lack any indicia of reliability).
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often unattainable standard of proving the statements to be extremely
prejudicial or confusing to jurors. 61
c. Racialized Medical Accusations
Similarly, albeit more subtly because the scientific community enjoys
the imprimatur of objectivity and neutrality, notwithstanding its
participation in white normativity and transparency, medical testimony
and records also partake in credibility injustice. Consider, for example,
neglect accusations that come under the guise of medical expertise.
Research shows that black and Hispanic pediatric emergency
room patients with minor head trauma are two to four times more
likely to be evaluated and then reported (as suspected abusive
head trauma) when compared with white, non-Hispanic patients.
Once there are suspicions of abuse, black children are more likely
to receive invasive testing like full body X-rays. 62
Again, we see the probative issues racial credibility injustice creates
even from the investigative stages. Medical professionals suspect child
abuse and discount nonwhite parents’ accounts involving injured children
at a much higher rate than they do white parents with injured children
under similar circumstances. As a result, parents who are POC are charged
with abuse and neglect and separated from their children at a much higher
rate than their white counterparts. These false accusations and removal of
children from their homes are not only emotionally devastating, but they
61. Under rules like 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, attorneys can ask
for the exclusion of that evidence by arguing that the racialized nature of the
evidence is ineffective towards aiding in the determination of truth, is unfairly
prejudicial, leads to confusion of the issues, and misleads the jury. However, the
attorney will be accused of trying to introduce race into the trial and discounting
the reliability of statements made concurrently to the events. In addition, courts
would probably consider the argument to be a stretch of the rules.
62. Jessica Horan-Block, A Child Bumps Her Head. What Happens Next
Depends on Race, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/
2019/08/24/opinion/sunday/child-injuries-race.html [https://perma.cc/Q7A3-SS
RS]. See Kent P. Hymel, Antoinette L. Laskey, Kathryn R. Crowell, Ming Wang,
Veronica Armijo-Garcia, Terra N. Frazier, Kelly S. Tieves KS, Robin Foster,
Kerri Weeks, Pediatric Brain Injury Research Network (PediBIRN) Investigators.
Racial and Ethnic Disparities and Bias in the Evaluation and Reporting of
Abusive Head Trauma, 198 J. PEDIATR. 137 (2018); C.W. Paine & J.N. Wood,
Skeletal surveys in young, injured children: A systematic review, 76 CHILD ABUSE
NEGL. 237.
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also typically end up depleting non-white parents of financial resources,
as they are forced to pay attorney’s fees, hefty expert-witness fees, and
court costs in an effort to disprove racialized fabricated accusations and
keep their families intact.
Supposedly neutral accusers typically suffer no consequences for
inflicting these emotional and financial costs on POC through their
racialized expert opinions. In addition, the records produced by doctors
are used to impeach the credibility of POC parents and support their
credibility deficit during the trial. Moreover, this evidence is unchecked in
terms of racial bias.
If attorneys were to bring evidence of the racialized nature of doctors’
reports during the trial, they would probably be accused of injecting race
into an otherwise race-neutral process (just as Rachel Jeantel was accused
of introducing race into the second-degree-murder trial of George
Zimmerman). 63 Defense attorneys, then, are compelled to challenge the
racialized evidence, and not with race-conscious studies indicating that the
great disparities in the medical determination of abuse are based on
implicit biases and the lack of “consistent application of evidence-based
decision rules and practice guidelines.”64 Rather, they are forced to retain
expensive experts who are tasked with somehow disproving a negative—
namely, that the defendants did not commit abuse or neglect. 65
d. Biased Forensic Evidence
Credibility injustice in pre-trial expert testimony and its consequences
is also distinguishable in forensic evidence. Research demonstrates how
extraneous information (i.e., non-medical information) can result in
cognitive biases in forensic pathology decision-making. 66 Recently, in the
trial against Derek Michael Chauvin for the murder of George Floyd, Dr.
Lindsey Thomas explained to the nation how forensic pathologists
determine whether an individual was murdered, suffered an accident, or
died from natural causes by looking at information extraneous to the
autopsy of the body, such as the multiple videos of Chauvin suffocating
63. Yamiche Alcindor, Trayvon Martin's friend: Encounter was racially
charged, USA TODAY (June 27, 2013), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/
nation/2013/06/27/trayvon-martin-sanford-zimmerman-florida-race/2462403/
[https://perma.cc/PDR2-DFDM].
64. Hymel et al., supra note 62 at 142.
65. Horan-Block, supra note 62.
66. Itiel Dror, Judy Melinek, Jonathan L. Arden, et al., Cognitive Bias in
Forensic Pathology Decisions, 66 J FORENSIC SCI. 1751 (2021) [hereinafter Dror
et al., Cognitive Bias].
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Floyd for 9 minutes and 29 seconds. 67 The doctor confirmed the results of
the State’s autopsy, which concluded that “the mechanism of Mr. Floyd’s
death was ‘asphyxia or low oxygen,’ a conclusion she said she reached
primarily [not through the medical evidence but] through review of video
footage of Mr. Floyd’s final minutes. 68 She stated that the medical
evidence from the autopsy “was helpful for ruling things out, including a
heart attack,” 69 but not for concluding the cause of the death.
Unfortunately, when it comes to extraneous evidence, the majority of
cases are not as clear-cut as Floyd’s. And in those not so clear-cut cases,
when forensic pathologists make determinations about the cause of death,
their judgment can be significantly affected by context-dependent,
medically irrelevant information, such as race. 70
Consider, for example, the determinations of causes of death of
children 6 years old or younger. Studies have shown that when forensic
pathologists make decisions regarding whether the cause of death in those
cases was an accident or a homicide, they base their determinations on the
67. Law & Crime Network, MN v. Derek Chauvin Trial Day 10 - Dr Lindsey
Thomas - Forensic Pathologist, YOUTUBE, https://youtu.be/dM2BJejdGwQ
[https://perma.cc/3N7Z-DGHD];
The following are snippets from Dr. Thomas testimony.
Dr. Thomas said that George Floyd died because “he was not
able to get enough oxygen in to maintain his bodily functions.”
She said she came to that conclusion mainly from “evidence
from the terminal events, the video evidence that show[s] Mr.
Floyd in a position where he was unable to adequately
breathe.”
Drugs and Heart Disease Were ‘Not Direct Causes’ of Floyd’s Death, Medical
Examiner Says, N.Y. TIMES (April 9, 2021) https://www.nytimes.com/live/
2021/04/09/us/derek-chauvin-trial#dr-lindsey-thomas-forensic-pathologist-takes
-the-stand [https://perma.cc/WZ8K-DWJU].
“Dr. Thomas said she needed to watch the video to really determine
what led to George Floyd’s death.” Id.
Medical examiners will always tell you that they cannot tell
everything from simply examining the body. They need to
know the circumstances of the death. In this case, the video is
medically relevant information — without it, Dr. Thomas is
saying, you might not be able to determine how he died. Id.
68. Marie Fazio, Dr. Lindsey Thomas, Forensic Pathologist, Takes the Stand,
N.Y. TIMES (April 9, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/live/2021/04/09/us/derekchauvin-trial#dr-lindsey-thomas-forensic-pathologist-takes-the-stand [https://per
ma.cc/U9XC-YGBJ].
69. Id.
70. Dror et al., Cognitive Bias, supra note 66 at 2, 6.
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race of the deceased, 71 proxies for race such as the identity of the victim’s
caretaker (e.g., boyfriend or grandmother), 72 and confirmation biases
based on racial stereotypical data about who usually commits homicides.73
As a result of the racialized evidence used, forensic pathologists are, all
else being equal, more likely to determine Black children’s than white
children’s deaths to be homicides rather than accidents. 74
3. Restoring Credibility
As we have seen, by applying the precipitating incident entry point
analysis to the credibility injustice motif, statements and opinions made
during the investigative stage have lasting effects on the admissibility of
racialized evidence in trials. The credibility imbalance carries over to the
trial and increases throughout the process with the use of impeachment
techniques and the application of evidence rules. Given this unavoidable
fact, we should enact new rules to minimize the injustice that typically
results from credibility injustice.
First, we should minimize credibility impeachments based on previous
acts of untruthfulness and prior convictions by abolishing these rules
because of their unreliability and racial unfairness. As discussed in the
case of false rape accusations, a POC defendant may be dragged into court
because of the credibility deficit he experiences. That deficit can widen
due to impeachment rules which allow attorneys to bring prior instances
of untruthful behavior that are not relevant and have been shown to not be
predictors of truthful testimony. 75 In addition, the racial testimonial
imbalance can be increased by the use of prior convictions that
disproportionately affect POC because of the racial disparities in mass
incarceration. Likewise, because good character buildup cannot be
demonstrated unless character is attacked, 76 the difference between the
surplus of white witnesses and the deficit of POC parties becomes larger.

71. Id. at 3.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 4.
74. Id. at 3.
75. Carodine, supra note 15 at 553-59; Rosario Lebrón, supra note 6 at 6063; Zeigler, supra note 35 at 646–47; Charles H. Kanter & Richard Page,
Impeaching and Rehabilitating a Witness with Character Evidence: Reputation,
Opinion, Specific Acts and Prior Convictions, 9 U.C.D. L. REV. 319, 324 (1976).
76. The rules of evidence, in general, prohibit the use of character evidence
to prove a witness’ good character for truthfulness unless his character for
truthfulness has been attacked. See FED. R. EVID. 608(a).
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Second, we should limit the application of hearsay rules or provide the
possibility to impeach such statements with implicit bias evidence even in
cases where race is not explicitly at issue. We should not restrict the use
of racial bias to cases only where race is being discussed, such as actions
that allege discrimination. 77 We saw in the case of Christian Cooper and
the confessions from the Central Park Five how false statements of
wrongdoing can be introduced into evidence even when a defendant does
not testify or the victim is aware of the falsehood of the statement and
decides not to proceed with the charges. This evidence is admitted without
any check on the truthfulness of the statements and without any possibility
of a challenge to their racialized nature. Thus, it is imperative that
attorneys and parties have recourse in those cases.
Third, we should implement new rules that counter credibility
injustice promoted by scientific and medical testimony. Specifically, rules
that help factfinders better discern whether expert testimony is based on
the consistent and unracialized application of standardized rules and
practices. 78 In other words, we should reform the standards for admission
of expert opinion by making Frye 79 (for those jurisdictions that still follow
it) and Daubert80 standards more stringent and race-conscious.
77. See, e.g., Yu v. Idaho State Univ., 11 F.4th 1065 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding
that hat evidence of implicit (or unconscious) bias against a member of a protected
class can be probative of whether an entity has engaged in intentional
discrimination in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964). Other
areas of the law in which implicit bias can be explicitly relevant are asylum on the
basis of race prosecution and affirmative action claims.
78. See Hymel et al., supra note 62 at 142.
79. Frye v. United States made scientific expert opinion admissible if the
basis for the opinion is based on generally accepted techniques by the relevant
scientific community. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923). This standard was later
overruled in federal courts by the Supreme Court of the United States in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 592–94 (1993). Most states
have adopted Daubert; however, some states still follow the Frye standard.
Admissibility of Expert Testimony in All 50 States, https://www.mwllaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/ADMISSIBILITY-OF-EXPERT-TESTI
MONY.pdf [https://perma.cc/LE3W-S6BV].
80. In Daubert, 509 U.S. 579, 592–94, the Supreme Court of the United
States established a non-exhaustive list to determine if a scientific expert is
qualified to testify. The following is a list of factors added to Frye’s generally
accepted standard: 1) the expert’s technique or theory can be tested and assessed
for reliability; 2) the technique or theory has been subject to peer review and
publication; 3) the known or potential rate of error of the technique or theory; and
4) the existence and maintenance of standards and controls. Id. The United States
Supreme Court extended the Daubert standard in 1999 to all expert testimony, not
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Researchers have recommended that “[m]edically relevant
information should be the primary driver of pathology decisions,
supplemented by the less medically relevant when needed and justified.
To achieve this, the forensic pathology community must explore and adopt
procedures that minimize bias.” 81
Some of the procedures suggested are Linear Sequential Unmasking
(LSU) and race-blind peer reviews. 82 LSU is a procedure that requires
“examiners not only to first examine the trace evidence in isolation from
the reference material, but also provides a balanced restriction on the
changes that are permitted post-exposure to the reference material.” In
other words, non-medical information such as race, place of residence, or
family composition that could lead to a race cognitive bias is withheld until
an analysis is produced. 83 If needed for a determination, extraneous
evidence is produced singly until a decision is reached. 84 If the rest of the
non-medical information is released after the analysis has been concluded,
no changes are permitted. 85 If changes are permitted, the initial
observation should remain in the record along with the extraneous
information released. 86 The researchers also recommended that “[t]o avoid
that non-medical decisions be unintentionally disguised as medical, the
forensic pathology reports and testimony must make it explicitly clear
what is medical and what is not medical.”87
Our rules of evidence should have the same requirements when
admitting forensic or medical evidence. Scientific reports that did not
undergo LSU or were not race-blind peer-reviewed should not be admitted
into evidence. This would diminish the amount of racialized expert
opinions that come into court. Reports must also include which medical
and non-medical information was used for the conclusion. Even if this
does not cure the issue that even medical information can be racialized as
medical knowledge has been built upon the study of cis, white, male
just scientific testimony. Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147
(1999).
81. Dror et al., Cognitive Bias, supra note 66 at 6.
82. Id.
83. Itiel E. Dror, William C. Thompson, Christian A. Meissner, Irv Kornfield,
Dan Krane, Michael Saks, and Michael Risinger Letter to the Editor— Context
Management Toolbox: A Linear Sequential Unmasking (LSU) Approach for
Minimizing Cognitive Bias, 60 FORENSIC DECISION MAKING. J FORENSIC SCI.
1111 (2015).
84. Id.
85. Id.at 1115.
86. Id.
87. Dror et al., Cognitive Bias, supra note 66 at 1756.

28

LSU LAW JOURNAL FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE & POLICY

[Vol. I & II

bodies, 88 it still recognizes that race and other factors could be part of the
decision of “unbiased” expert conclusions. This would allow race to be at
the forefront and be used for impeachment purposes if needed without
attorneys having to be fallaciously singled out for trying to “inject” race
into the trial.
B. White Normativity & Transparency
Even if we can cure the system from admitting racialized evidence
predicated on credibility injustice, race finds its way into court even more
insidiously through the adjudication of facts based on white normativity.
By moving from the investigative stage to the deliberation stage, we see
that triers of fact base their adjudications on functional evidence such as
demeanor, idiolect, and clothing. 89 This type of evidence, completely
unregulated by the rules as Professor Capers has shown, 90 is fraught with
racialized notions that augment credibility injustice and allow the
introduction of race without any check or recourse. 91 This reality,
however, is hidden by the phenomenon of white transparency.
88. Arnold M. Epstein & John Z. Ayanian, Racial Disparities in Medical
Care, 344(19) N. ENGL. J MED., 1471 (2001) (explaining how “racial disparities
in medical care are particularly troubling for at least two reasons: the possibility
that they reflect discrimination or racial bias on the part of physicians and their
potentially deleterious effects on health outcomes.”); "Clinical Trials Need More
Diversity", Scientific American Sept. 1, 2018, https://www.scientificamerican
.com/article/clinical-trials-have-far-too-little-racial-and-ethnic-diversity/(noting
how participants in clinical trials for new drugs are, in some cases, 80-90% white);
Mary-Jo Del Vecchio Good, Byron J. Good & Anne E. Becker, Unequal
Treatment: Confronting Racial and Ethnic Disparities in UNEQUAL TREATMENT:
CONFRONTING RACIAL AND ETHNIC DISPARITIES IN HEALTH CARE (Brian D.
Smedley et al. 2003), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK220349/
[https://perma.cc/Z5XA-JQUC] (describing how critical perspectives in the study
of medicine culture “has largely been ignored by most research to date or which
has circumscribed cultural inquiry to the differences between patient and
physicians ‘beliefs.’”).
89. Although demeanor is acknowledged in Evidence and Confrontation
jurisprudence as a central pillar of adjudicating the truth and the credibility of a
witness as well as in some statutes or rules, how triers of fact are supposed to use
this evidence is left unregulated. Capers, supra note 19, at 869; Julia Simon-Kerr,
Unmasking Demeanor, 88 GEO. WASH. L. REV. ARGUENDO 158, 163 (2020)
[hereinafter Simon-Kerr, Unmasking Demeanor]. Moreover, the jurisprudence
and the law presume there is a universality to the verbal and nonverbal cues that
are not going to be interpreted in racialized ways.
90. Capers, supra note 19 at 871.
91. Id. at 880.
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1. Racialized Functional Evidence
White normativity is the normalization/naturalization of white
conduct, experiences, norms, worldviews, and praxes as the “standard by
which all other racial groups find themselves measured” (individually,
institutionally, and socially).92 White transparency, on the other hand,
refers to our tendency not to think about the white normalized rules, ideas,
practices, behaviors, and experiences as white-specific. 93 If it were not for
white transparency, we would be able to see that our judicial process is
rarely exempt from race considerations and those adjudications are often
made based on white normative standards such as demeanor.
An individual’s verbal and nonverbal cues or demeanor are
“considered part and parcel of how jurors [and judges] should evaluate
witness testimony.”94 Our probative system rests on the assumption that
verbal and nonverbal cues are universal and, thus, demeanor can aid in the
determination of a witness’s credibility. This notion is false. 95 In addition,
the interpretative universality of these cues is fallacious as it rests on white
norms.
While there are some commonalities across cultures and social groups
in terms of the communicative meaning of body language, facial
expressions, and intonation, social science researchers have abandoned the
92. Deirdre M. Bowen, Meeting Across the River: Why Affirmative Action
Needs Race & Class Diversity, 88 DENV. U. L. REV. 751, 757 n. 44 (2011).
93. Barbara J. Flagg, ‘‘Was Blind, but Now I See’': White Race
Consciousness and the Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV.
953, 957 (1993).
94. Capers, supra note 19 at 880.
95. See Justin D. Levinson, Forgotten Racial Equality: Implicit Bias,
Decisionmaking, and Misremembering, 57 DUKE L.J. 345 (2007) (finding that
participants remembered and misremembered legally relevant facts in racially
biased ways); Dennis J. Devine & David E. Caughlin, Do They Matter? A MetaAnalytic Investigation of Individual Characteristics and Guilt Judgments, 20
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 109, 124–25 (2014) (examining the extent to which
characteristics of jurors and defendants are associated with juror judgments of
guilt); M. Kimberly MacLin et al., The Effect of Defendant Facial Expression on
Mock Juror Decision-Making: The Power of Remorse, 11 N. AM. J. PSYCHOL.
323, 329 (2009) (researchers manipulated the display of remorse and anger in
defendant photographs and found that that a remorseful defendant resulted in
more lenient verdicts compared to an angry defendant); Robert Forsterlee, Lynne
Forsterlee, Irwin A. Horowitz & Ellen King, The effects of defendant race, victim
race, and juror gender on evidence processing in a murder trial, 24 BEHAV. SCI.
LAW, 179 (2006) (examining the effects of defendant race, victim race, and juror
gender on sentencing and information processing in murder trials).
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universality theory. 96 One of the current theories is that verbal and
nonverbal cues are like dialects. 97 In other words, interpreting demeanor,
like interpreting a person’s speech, is a culturally dependent task. Even in
the presence of a shared repertoire of cues or lexicon (in the case of
speech), the meaning of the cues could be vastly different depending on
the social group who is using them. Interpreting whether a person is angry,
sad, scared, happy, or lying can, thus, lead to misinterpretations.98 Yet, our
evidentiary system operates under the premise that we live in a
monocultural society (i.e., white culture) and we can determine the
meaning of a witness’ demeanor without any harmful or racialized effects.
Moreover, studies have found that because cues are culturally specific,
people have an in-group advantage when interpreting them. 99 That means
that if one is part of a group, one would be more successful at interpreting
the cues from that group than a person who is not. For example, people
who belong to groups in which it is the norm not to look in the eyes when
speaking to someone would not interpret this as a sign that the person is
lying, as is the white norm.
The conclusions of these studies would suggest that diversifying juries
to include people who might be fluent in the witnesses’ cues could remedy
some of the problems associated with the reliance on demeanor and its
privileged position in our probative system. However, white transparency
affects not only white triers of fact but also nonwhite ones.
As Professor Gonzalez Rose has put it: “Even people of color might
adhere to white normativity in the sphere of the courtroom since it is a
‘white space’ where courtroom participants are expected to ‘perform
whiteness’ irrespective of their racial or cultural backgrounds.”100 For that
reason, a diverse jury and jury pool or a diverse bench, albeit important
additions which would hopefully facilitate the confrontation of whiteness
in the courtroom, are not the ultimate solutions. Nonwhite judges and
jurors have their hands tied in using race if it is not at issue or they risk
being sanctioned or compromising the trial.
Moreover, beyond the fact that meanings of cues are culturally and
socially construed, the question of whether the assumptions associated
with the cues are accurate still remains. Recent psychological studies point
96. Hillary A. Elfenbein & Nalini Ambady, Universals and Cultural
Differences in Recognizing Emotions, 12(5) CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE, 159, 160. (2003).
97. Id. at 161-62.
98. See id.
99. Id. at 161.
100. Gonzalez Rose, Toward a Critical Race Theory of Evidence, supra note
8 at 2300.
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to the existence of a lie bias by which it cannot be shown that we can detect
lies by observing someone’s behavior. 101 Even Joe Navarro, a former FBI
behavioral analysis program agent, has acknowledged the “need to stop
associating behaviors indicative of psychological discomfort with
deception.” 102 In his analysis of over two hundred DNA exonerations
where convicted people on death row were exonerated, he concluded that
100% of the officers were not able to detect the truth when suspects
claimed that they did not commit the crime.103 In other words, all of the
officers failed in their assumption that the defendant was lying based on
nonverbal cues. Navarro also explains how he would ask jurors in federal
cases about the basis for their determination that a witness was lying and
they would reply that it was based on nonverbal cues that have no bearing
on credibility. 104
Notwithstanding the issue with the reliability of the demeanor
evidence and its white normativity character, we continue to use it and,
even more, privilege it in court. This, in combination with other functional
evidence like race, creates further issues and contradictions with settled
principles in Evidence law such as character evidence.
As Professor Mikah K. Thompson has explained:
The implicit belief that African-Americans are inherently violent
can be used as both a sword and a shield in a trial concerning a
violent criminal act. Rather than offering inadmissible evidence of
a Black defendant's character for violence, the government can
instead offer evidence of the defendant's stereotypical Blackness,
thereby playing upon the jurors' implicit biases to establish the
guilt of the defendant. Likewise, a non-Black defendant need not
offer evidence of a Black victim's violent character to support a
claim of self-defense. Rather, the victim's stereotypical Blackness

101. Aldert Vrij, Maria Hartwig, & Pär Anders Granhag, Reading Lies:
Nonverbal Communication and Deception, 70 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 295, 307–08
(2019).
102. Joe Navarro, The End of Detecting Deception, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY (July
15, 2018), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/spycatcher/201807/theend-detecting-deception [hereinafter Navarro, Detecting Deception].
103. Joe Navarro, Detecting Lies vs. Detecting Truth - Serious Implication
(Oct. 31, 2010), https://www.psychologytoday.com/us/blog/spycatcher/201010/
detecting-lies-vs-detecting-truth-serious-implications [https://perma.cc/WN2E-X
X7K].
104. Id. (discussing common myths about nonverbal behavior that produce
misleading conclusions about a witness’ credibility).
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is sufficient character evidence. 105
This play on blackness and character evidence is not only achieved by
the displaying of the defendant’s race in court but also by showing how
much his demeanor varies from the white norm. Attorneys don’t need a
defendant to take the stand to make that display. The prosecution can bring
the deviant demeanor from white norms through the testimony of
witnesses that interacted with the defendant. Lawyers do so by forcing the
defendant’s reactions to objections or legal arguments that deviate from
the white norm. Having the defendant in court allows jurors and attorneys
to construct racialized proof based on a departure from white norms
demeanor of the defendant. 106 And if the defendant takes the stand,
attorneys display the deviant demeanor through a skillful ̶ and perhaps,
bullied ̶ cross-examination meant to accentuate the race gap and alienate
the defendant from the triers of fact. The same type of racialized strategy
can be performed on non-party witnesses through cross-examination and
objections. 107
Yet, defense attorneys do not have at their disposal any mechanism to
challenge this racialized practice as it is executed through the veil of white
transparency. Even though demeanor is central to our evidentiary
practices, the rules do not provide a way to formally challenge it.
Moreover, a “trier of fact is not required to detail the witness's specific
physical appearance or conduct that led to the credibility
determination.”108 As such, race can be coded in multiple ways that hide
its use and normalization.
A way to counteract such introduction of race prejudices into a trial
would be to eliminate or attenuate the access to demeanor. The COVID19 pandemic has provided us with an opportunity to see what that would
look like. As a way to prevent the spread of the disease, witnesses and
defendants have been required to wear masks in courts. This has reduced
the amount of information related to demeanor available to triers of fact.
Challenges have been brought regarding the constitutionality of such
105. Mikah K. Thompson, Blackness as Character Evidence, 20 MICH. J.
RACE & L. 321, 322 (2015).
106. Capers, supra note 19 at 884 (discussing how demeanor determinations
are racially contingent, how studies have found that how jurors interpret facial
expressions depends on the race of the juror and the race of the defendant, and
how there are problems with cross-racial identifications of remorse).
107. Carlin, supra note 8 at 481–82 (describing the cross of Rachel Jeantel in
the trial of George Zimmerman).
108. Honorable James P. Timony, Demeanor Credibility, 49 CATH. U. L. REV.
903, 930 (2000).
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measures under the guise of a violation of the Confrontation Clause
because of the impossibility to assess the witness’ demeanor. 109
Professor Julia Simon-Kerr has been cautiously optimistic about what
we can learn from our unfounded reliance on demeanor during the
COVID-19 pandemic. She points out that there “is some direct evidence”
based on a mock jury study that when demeanor evidence is not available
or limited, as when wearing a mask, we might instead simply listen to the
testimony and pay attention to the verbal cues and to the story itself;
improving the probabilities of detecting a lie above chance level. 110
However, she acknowledges that not all witnesses might be perceived
equally even if everyone is wearing a mask. For example, black men could
be perceived as more threatening. 111 Although she ponders whether “such
biases might be muted in a courtroom in which all participants are masked,
particularly if the masks are uniform and provided by the court,” 112 I am
less optimistic about the implementation of a similar practice to reduce our
reliance on demeanor.
Even if biases mutate in a way that would benefit members of the
nonwhite culture, other functional evidence like speech would serve to
discount their testimony. It has been documented that idiolect, 113 accent,114
and English dialects115 are used to discount credibility. For example, the
use of African American Vernacular English (AAVE) in courts
proceedings or during pre-trial stages as opposed to “standard English”
(the white normative dialect of English that because white transparency it
is neither recognized as such nor often challenged in court on racial
109. Pueblo v. Cruz Rosario, 204 D.P.R. 1040, 2020 WL 5238749; State v.
Jesenya O., No. A-1-CA-39148, 2021 WL 959292 (N.M. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2021)
Commonwealth v. Masa, No. 1981CR0307, 2020 WL 4743019 (Mass. Super.
Aug. 10, 2020); State v. Smith, No. ED 108626, 2021 WL 1619283 (Mo. Ct. App.
Apr. 27, 2021). “[T]he Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause arguably
includes the right to display demeanor while confronting witnesses (i.e., disbelief,
derision, or disappointment).” Capers, supra note 19; supra note 95.
110. Simon-Kerr, supra note 89 at 171 (discussing how a recent mock juror
study sought to test whether niqab-wearing by witnesses would hamper truthseeking).
111. Id. at 173.
112. Id.
113. Carlin, supra note 8 at 477-484.
114. Bonnie Urciuoli, EXPOSING PREJUDICE: PUERTO RICAN EXPERIENCES OF
LANGUAGE, RACE, AND CLASS 2 (1996).
115. Laura Victorelli, The Right to Be Heard (and Understood): Impartiality
and the Effect of Sociolinguistic Bias in the Courtroom, 80 U. PITT. L. REV. 709
(2019); Gelsey G. Beaubrun, Talking Black: Destigmatizing Black English and
Funding Bi-Dialectal Education Programs, 10 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 196 (2020).
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grounds) has disastrous effects in the administration of justice.116
Similarly, with “any sign of accent or divergent stylization (read: signs of
race or class or both), even native English speakers can be marked as
speaking improper English,”117 and, thus, being penalized with a
credibility bias for not adhering to white norms. 118 Yet, these racialized
linguistic practices of bias often go unchecked in court. As, with
demeanor, racialized linguistic functional evidence enters the court and
finds its way into adjudications.
2. Breaking the Silence from White Normativity & Transparency
If we consider how white normativity and transparency operate in the
deliberations of triers of fact and consider various access points for reform,
we can produce ways to correct some of these problems. One could be as
radical as to implement blind testimony by having trial transcripts read by
computers to jurors to avoid the unfounded use of demeanor in their
deliberation. 119 In theory, this solution should not face any constitutional
problems for civil matters. However, in criminal trials, that solution would
violate the Confrontation Clause under its current understanding, 120 unless
the defendant waives the right to have the jury present synchronous to the
trial. Thus, we might look at different solutions for criminal trials like the
following: (1) offering implicit bias training to jurors, attorneys, and
judges; 121 (2) requiring legal education seminars on the basic principles of
116. L. Danielle Tully, The Cultural (Re)turn: The Case for Teaching
Culturally Responsive Lawyering, 16 STAN. J. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES 201
(2020); Caleb L. Green, Upholding the Constitution Through Diversity, NEV.
LAW., February 2021, at 16.
117. Carlin, supra note 8 at 450, 474.
118. I, as a Puerto Rican English speaker, am often discredited because of my
accent and stylization irrespective of my language abilities. See id. at 474.
119. This solution is sort of an LSU of testimony.
120. Maryland· v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836, 845 (1990) (“The central concern of
the Confrontation Clause is to ensure the reliability of the evidence against a
criminal defendant by subjecting it to rigorous testing in the context of an
adversary proceeding before the trier of fact.”).
121. However, the effectiveness of implicit bias training has been questioned.
See Jason A. Cantone, Federal and State Court Cooperation: Effectiveness of
Implicit Bias Trainings, FED. JUD. CTR., https://www.fjc.gov/content/3
37738/effectiveness-implicit-bias-trainings
[https://perma.cc/X5WH-UL2N];
Robert J. Smith, Reducing Racially Disparate Policing Outcomes: Is Implicit Bias
Training the Answer, 37 U. HAW. L. REV. 295 (2015); Phillip A. Goff, Jillian K.
Swencionis, & Susan A. Bandes, Why Behavioral Reforms Are More Likely Than
Implicit Bias Training To Reduce Racial Conflicts in U.S. Policing, SCHOLARS
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CRT for all legal actors; (3) pre-trial trainings for jurors about the
shortcomings of demeanor and other functional evidence; (4) mandatory
jury instructions in every trial directing jurors not to take into account the
race, speech, and other functional evidence of witnesses; 122 (5) having
self-assessment forms for jurors or judges to check their biases during their
deliberations; (6) polls to measure the use of implicit biases of jurors
during deliberations; and (7) the creation of closed-circuit-television
(CCTV) for witnesses (and maybe for every trial player) to diminish the
amount of nonverbal cues that can be used in the liberations. 123
This last solution has been tested as well due to the COVID-19
pandemic. Due to the public health emergency, trials have proceeded
virtually through platforms such as Zoom, 124 Skype, 125 and Teams.126
Even though we had limited experience with CCTV for certain witnesses
(i.e., minors in sexual abuse cases) 127, its extent is not comparable with
virtual trials or hearings where all proceedings are taking place outside the
court, a white normative space, and all players are somehow equalized on
their hierarchy by the impersonal boxes in our screens.
STRATEGY NETWORK (March 8, 2018), https://scholars.org/brief/why-behavioralreforms-are-more-likely-implicit-bias-training-reduce-racial-conflicts-us
[https://perma.cc/X2HA-5539]; Frank Kineavy, Implicit Bias Training for Police
Gaining Attention, DIVERSITYINC (Oct. 10, 2016), http://www.diversity
inc.com/news/implicit-bias-training-police-gaining-attention [https://perma.cc/P
4R9-ERXF]; Destiny Peery, Opinion, Implicit Bias Training for Police May Help,
but It's Not Enough, HUFFINGTON POST (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www.huff
ingtonpost.com/destiny-peery/implicit-bias-training-fo_b_9464564.html [https://
perma.cc/3ZW4-QHNF]; Michael Noon, Pointless Diversity Training:
Unconscious Bias, New Racism and Agency, Work, 32(1) EMPLOYMENT AND
SOCIETY, 198–209 (2018).
122. Capers, supra note 19, at 898-900. See People v. Boone, 30 N.Y.3d 521,
91 N.E.3d 1194 (2017) (holding that when a witness identifying a defendant is of
a different race, a trial court is required to give, upon request, a jury charge on
cross-racial identification biases).
123. These solutions can be implemented as well in civil cases.
124. See Illinois’s instructions for conducting hearings on Zoom, https://
19thcircuitcourt.state.il.us/DocumentCenter/View/2812/Zoom-Instruction-andProtocol-Sheet?bidId= [https://perma.cc/2QYB-DZAC].
125. See New York’s instructions for conducting hearings on Skype,
https://www.nycourts.gov/courts/nyc/SSI/images/CORONA/Skype_Instructions
.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HPB-HJGG].
126. See Washington’s instructions for conducting hearings on Teams,
http://www.washingtoncourts.us/DocumentCenter/View/445/Guide-to-VirtualHearings-and-Microsoft-Teams- [https://perma.cc/JY44-FKDA].
127. Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
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Some judges have recognized the equalizing nature of the virtual space
in which “charismatic or bullying lawyers” are kept from steamrolling
everyone else. 128 This solution presents the same challenges as computer
read transcripts to jurors in terms of the Confrontation Clause. Thus, it
would require in criminal cases, as courts currently do, 129 a waiver of the
defendant’s right to an in-person trial. But this is not the only challenge
that this equalizing solution presents.
Attorneys participating in trials through videoconferencing report a
decline in empathy. 130 And perhaps there is some truth to that. A Journal
of Criminal Law and Criminology article reports that the use of CCTV in
bail hearings in Cook County, Illinois raised by 51% on average bail
amounts while in-person bails remain the same. 131 This seems to suggest
that the absence of personal contact could make adjudicators act more
severely and less empathetically.
However, some have argued that “video-conferencing could create
new opportunities for understanding and empathy” as jurors, attorneys,
and judges could see the environment witnesses and parties inhabit and
feel more palpable the consequences of their adjudications or perhaps
better understand parties and witnesses. 132 Yet, that would require a deeper
transformation of the legal canons so that they no longer privilege white
normativity. The plethora of articles discussing how to observe “good” or
“appropriate” behavior or etiquette during virtual trials and about how
witnesses and defendants have consistently and “comically” ignored these
rules is a good indicator of how far we might be from the transformation
of those white canons. 133 When litigants, for example in rent court
128. Eric Scigliano, Zoom Court Is Changing How Justice Is Served For
better, for worse, and possibly forever, THE ATLANTIC (April 13, 2021),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2021/05/can-justice-be-servedon-zoom/618392/ [https://perma.cc/R7DM-M3VH].
129. Court Operations During COVID-19: 50-State Resources, JUSTIA
https://www.justia.com/covid-19/50-state-covid-19-resources/court-operationsduring-covid-19-50-state-resources/ [https://perma.cc/CYB8-5J55] (last visited
April 4, 2022).
130. Scigliano, supra note 128.
131. Shari S. Diamond et. al., Efficiency and Cost: The Impact of
Videoconferenced Hearings on Bail Decisions, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
869, 892 (2010).
132. Scigliano, supra note 128.
133. Zoom Court Dos and Don’ts, PRO LEGAL CARE LLC https://prolegal
care.com/zoom-court-dos-and-donts/ [https://perma.cc/DA8A-VVVG] (last visited
April 4, 2022); Dani Kass, Judge Warns Attys Not To Be Slobs in Video Hearings,
LAW360 (April 14, 2021), https://www.law360.com/articles/1372802/judge-warnsattys-not-to-be-slobs-in-video-hearings [https://perma.cc/7REY-S2KA]; Andrew
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proceedings or in cases of sexualized violence, present their narratives in
alternatives forms from the standard legal canon they are deemed
untrustworthy; 134. Moreover, entering into the personal spaces would open
the door for the use of more functional evidence in deliberations, probably
increasing the racialized nature of adjudications for falling outside the
white norm and further suppressing nonwhite narratives.
3. A Silenced Duchess
We see the effects and the makings of this racist strategy in Markle’s
interview as well. After being asked by Oprah if she was silenced by the
Royal Family, Markle explained that she believed that she was going to be
protected, only to later realize that she would not. 135 They specifically
discussed how she was asked not to make any public statements to deny
or refute reports on the tabloids about her. 136 Perhaps, the most salient
gossip was that Markle made Catherine, Duchess of Cambridge (Kate) cry
during the preparations for her wedding to Prince Harry. 137 When, as we
found out from Oprah’s interview, it was the other way around. 138 She felt
that she was not given the same treatment that the Royal Family gave
Kate. 139 But, more importantly, Markle discovered how white norms
Wolfson, Virtual Court Hearings in 2020 Have it All: Nudity, beer, bikinis and
barking dogs, USA TODAY (Dec. 21, 2020), https://www.usatoday.com/story
/news/nation/2020/12/21/amid-covid-19-zoom-court-hearings-include-nudity-be
er-bikinis-dogs/3956427001/ [https://perma.cc/3PU9-PW76]; Elisabeth Waldon,
Declining Decorum: Judges Strive to Maintain Order in the Courtroom in the Age
of Zoom, THE DAILY NEWS (December 21, 2020), https://thedailynews.cc/articles/
declining-decorum/ [https: //perma.cc/62VZ-JNDS].
134. See Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and
Subordination of Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV.
533 (1992) (describing how pro se litigants in landlord-tenant cases are often
ignored and dismissed for not fitting the legal narrative canon); Kim L. Scheppele,
Just the Facts, Ma’am: Sexualized Violence, Evidentiary Habits, and the Revision
of the Truth, 37 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV 123 (1992) (describing how victims of gender
violence are not believed because the way they tell their stories does not fit the
judicial mold of the truth).
135. Sun Reporter, supra note 2.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id. See also, Mikhaila Friel, Buckingham Palace Continues to Protect
Prince Andrew but it's a Different Story for Meghan Markle, INSIDER (Mar 5,
2021),
https://www.insider.com/buckingham-palace-protects-prince-andrewrejects-prince-harry-meghan-2021-3 [https://perma.cc/RFR7-RX44] (discussing
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applied to her. The public, contrary to what happens with other members
of the Royal family that do not deny gossip publicly, believed that the
rumors about her were true. The net result of her experience was that she
was silenced, her story was squashed, and she was turned into a villain.
The same happens in our evidentiary system. We believe that the
system is structured to bring out the truth of what happened but
systemically POC’s experiences are silenced through white normativity
and transparency. Moreover, jurors, attorneys, or judges of color, like
Markle, are not granted many opportunities by the system nor do they feel
that they should consider race or their own experiences when interpreting
the evidence being introduced at the trial. Additionally, unless race is at
the forefront of the issue in a trial, race is deemed oftentimes irrelevant
(when it seldom is).
C. Contestation of Racialized Evidence & Its Backlash
Exposing this truth is not an easy task. But more importantly, it should
not be left to legal actors to do so on their own. Unmasking white
transparency and normativity and exposing credibility injustice is a
complicated process not only because of their well-concealed nature but
because the system is built to deter their contestation. When legal players
challenge racialized evidence, they are faced with backlash. Moreover, the
onus to challenge non-blatant racial injustice and introduce nonwhite
narratives as truth in the judicial processes falls mostly on POC. This is
the reality that the third motif, the contestation of racialized evidence and
its backlash, evokes.
1. White Fragile Pundits
This motif is present, too, in the aftermath of Markle’s interview. The
embodiment of this issue in Markle’s case was the reaction of British
pundit Piers Morgan and the discussion on the racist nature of that
response that sparked between The Talk co-hosts Sharon Osbourne and
Sheryl Underwood.
Following the interview, Morgan tweeted, “I wouldn’t believe
Meghan Markle if she gave me a weather report.”140 He then followed suit
how Prince Andrew, who has been accused of sexual assault by one of Jeffrey
Epstein’s victims who has (and published) photos of the two together, has
received a different treatment as the Palace continues to protect him).
140. Piers Morgan (@piersmorgan), TWITTER (March 8, 2021, 1:15 A.M.),
https://twitter.com/piersmorgan/status/1368792528632348674
[https://perma.cc/L2P7-NKDK].
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by attacking Markle’s credibility and calling the allegations of racism
cowardly and unfounded in a column in the Daily Mail. 141 After the
column was published, Morgan was called out on air for his racist

141. His relevant remarks were as follow:
First, Meghan claimed to have been left suicidal by the
pressure of being a Princess and had her requests for help
rejected by the cold, heartless Palace.
We weren't told who did the rejecting, or why she couldn't
seek her own therapy or treatment if that's what she felt she
needed. After all, her husband has spent years talking about
mental health and has close connections with all the major
mental health charities.
Instead, we're left to believe the Palace spurned a pregnant
suicidal woman in her hour of desperate need.
But that wasn't even the most explosive revelation.
No, that came when Meghan told Oprah that a member of the
Royal Family had queried what colour her baby would be
during a conversation with Harry.
In fact, she said there were several conversations, whereas he
said there was only one.
But neither of them would name the offending Royal.
Harry said he would never reveal the name.
So, we're now left to view all the Royals as racists.
Nor were we given any details of exactly what was said, or in
what context it was said.
Would an older senior Royal innocently asking Harry what
skin colour his baby might have, given that Meghan's mother
is black and her father white, constitute racism?
It would if there was any derogatory tone to the question, or
any suggestion that it would be a problem how dark the child's
skin was. But we don't know the answers to those vital
questions, because having let off the racism bomb, the
Sussexes won't say any more.
I find that cowardly.
And the racism charge got worse.
Piers Morgan, PIERS MORGAN: Meghan and Harry's Nauseating Two-Hour
Oprah Whine-athon was a Disgraceful Diatribe of Cynical Race-Baiting
Propaganda Designed to Damage the Queen as Her Husband Lies in Hospital and Destroy the Monarchy, MAIL ONLINE (March 8, 2021),
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-9338343/PIERS-MORGAN-MeghanHarrys-nauseating-two-hour-Oprah-whine-athon-disgraceful-diatribe.html
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comments by Good Morning Britain co-host Alex Beresford. 142 Morgan
faced this confrontation by quitting the show live. 143
Sharon Osbourne defended Morgan on Twitter, saying the following:
@piersmorgan I am with you. I stand by you. People forget that
you’re paid for your opinion and that you’re just speaking your
truth.
The View co-host Sheryl Underwood confronted Osbourne on the
show about her support for Morgan. She stated the following:
I’ve never seen anything come out of you [Sharon] other than, “If
I don’t know, I’m willing to learn. If it comes off a certain way, I
stand corrected.” So, what would you say to people who may feel
that while you’re standing by your friend, it appears that you give
validation or safe haven to something that he has uttered that is
racist? 144
Osbourne responded with various statements among the following: “I
don’t know what he uttered that is racist. I’m not trying to slide out of this
one. Tell me. What has he uttered that is racist?”145 She continued her
argument by turning herself into a victim by saying, “I feel even like I’m
about to be put in the electric chair because I have a friend who many
people think is a racist, so that makes me a racist.” 146 Finally, she defended
herself from allegedly being called a racist for defending Morgan by
stating, “How can I be racist about anybody or anything in my life? How
can I?” 147After some profane language and a commercial break, Osbourne
questioned Underwood’s intentions and flipped the burden on her by
saying, “I will ask you again, Sheryl. And don’t try and cry. If anyone
should be crying, it should be me. Educate me. Tell me when you have
heard [Piers Morgan] say racist things. Educate me. Tell me.”148
142. Good Morning Britain, supra note 27.
143. Sharon Osbourne (@MrsSOsbourne), TWITTER (March 9, 2021, 2:57
P.M.), https://twitter.com/MrsSOsbourne/status/1369361831354073091 [https://
perma.cc/3UCP-XZMU].
144. Ryan Schocket, Sharon Osbourne and Sheryl Underwood Had a
Discussion About Race and Things Got Heated, BUZZFEED (Mar 13, 2021),
https://www.buzzfeed.com/ryanschocket2/sharon-osbourne-sheryl-underwoodthe-talk [https://perma.cc/H3ZN-SYRK].
145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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Underwood, keeping her composure in light of Osbourne’s selfproclaimed victimization and her neglect of Markle’s racist treatment (i.e.,
white fragility), 149 assumed the unwarranted role of a teacher in racism.
This is a role many of us POC are often required to undertake because of
white normativity and transparency. And, as perhaps she has been forced
to do many times before, Underwood explained to Osbourne that
[i]t was not the exact words of racism, it’s the implications and
reaction to it. To not want to address that she is a Black woman
and to try to dismiss it or to make it seem less than what it is, that's
what makes it racist. But right now, I’m talking to a woman who
I believe is my friend. I don’t want anybody here to watch this and
say we’re attacking you for being racist. 150
Osbourne mocking Underwood stated that it was too late and that she
believed that the seed was already sowed. 151
After further exchanges in which Underwood attempted to explain that
she was not calling her a racist but that there was a racist behavior in
Morgan’s actions and that its defense is also a product of racist practices,
Osbourne replied, “Ok, answer me this one. OK? Because I don’t
understand. If he doesn’t like somebody — and I think this is for
everybody born white — if Piers doesn’t like someone, and they happen
to be Black, does that make him a racist?” 152
Underwood, replied with a clear answer to the fallacious reframing of
the issue: “No”. 153 What Sharon Osbourne does not seem to understand is
that racism and racial subordination can exist without discriminatory
intent. 154 The structure and the purpose of racist practices live beyond the
149. “In 2011, [Robin] DiAngelo coined the term ‘white fragility’ to describe
the disbelieving defensiveness that white people exhibit when their ideas about
race and racism are challenged—and particularly when they feel implicated in
white supremacy.” Katy Waldman, A Sociologist Examines the “White Fragility”
That Prevents White Americans from Confronting Racism, THE NEW YORKER
(July 23, 2018), https://www.newyorker.com/books/page-turner/a-sociologistexamines-the-white-fragility-that-prevents-white-americans-from-confronting-ra
cism [https://perma.cc/5M5K-WRZ8]. See Robin DiAngelo, White Fragility, in
497 COUNTERPOINTS 497 245 (2016); Robin DiAngelo, WHITE FRAGILITY: WHY
IT'S SO HARD FOR WHITE PEOPLE TO TALK ABOUT RACISM (2018).
150. Schocket, supra note 144.
151. Id.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. This is not the first time that Osbourne seems to have missed how racism
operates, especially white transparency. Following Underwood and Osbourne’s
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individual intent of one person, just like the historically racist practices of
racism in the United States have lived in the evidence rules such as
hearsay, character evidence, impeachment, expert testimony, demeanor
rules, or any other rule of our probative system.
2. Challenges to Racialized Adjudication
Their exchange invites us to question how we challenge racial
subordination in our evidence rules without unleashing the backlash that
usually ensues when, as in Underwood and Osbourne’s exchange, we
challenge racialized evidence practices or how do we deal with this
inevitable reaction. It also makes us think about how to make the
legislative and the judiciary understand that our system is inherently racist
and that the burden to correct its racial injustice cannot be put on a few of
its participants, especially not the ones who suffered its prejudicial effects.
Despite the undisputed evidence about the pervasiveness of racial
subordination practices in our legal system, our rules operate under a
presumption of colorblindness. Our probative system has very few
checkpoints to correct the admissibility of racialized evidence or prevent
its effects during adjudications nor does it penalize actors who engaged in
racist practices through the rules of evidence. Moreover, as recent case law
shows, people engaging in these racist practices rarely feel safe to share
them explicitly so that the system takes corrective measures. And in those
rare occasions, it is on the shoulders of those suffering the effects of racial
injustice to seek its redress.
Take, for example, the Sixth Circuit opinion in Harden v. Hillman155
extending to civil cases the no-impeachment rule 156 exception crafted by
the United States Supreme Court in Pena-Rodriguez v. Colorado157, which
generally bars evidence of jury deliberations. Under this exception,
[w]here a juror makes a clear statement that indicates he or she
relied on racial stereotypes or animus to convict a criminal
exchange, former The Talk co-host, Holly Robinson Peete, spoke about how
Osbourne complained that she was “too ghetto.” Holly Robinson Peete😷😷😷😷
(@hollyrpeete), TWITTER (March 12, 2021 11:35 P.M.), https://twitter.com/holly
rpeete/status/1370428336028090372 [https://perma.cc/4CGP-2L9K]. A clear
reference to how Robinson Pete did not follow acceptable norms of white
behavior and should refrain from doing so on national TV, which is another
manifestation of racism.
155. 993 F.3d 465, 479 (6th Cir. 2021).
156. FED. R. EVID. 606(b).
157. 137 S. Ct. 855, 869 (2017).
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defendant, the Sixth Amendment requires the no-impeachment
rule give way in order to permit the trial court to consider the
evidence of the juror’s statement and any resulting denial of the
jury trial guarantee. 158
The exception requires showing overt racism. However, overt racism
is not enough. The Supreme Court also requires that “the racial animus
was a significant motivating factor in the juror’s vote to convict.”159
To unveil white transparency and see proof of that as required by the
Supreme Court is exceedingly difficult and exceptional. As Harden
shows, jurors must feel that the other jurors share their own racist
prejudices or that they will not face any consequences for expressing those
views (as it was in the case of Harden). It is unlikely that defendants will
be able to show overt racism as a significant motivating factor because
even jurors who harbor racist prejudice that affects their analysis are
unlikely to voice that prejudice unless they feel comfortable doing so
among a group of relative strangers. The only way that would happen is if
jurors think their fellow jurors are white (or white-passing) with the same
race values. In a group of jurors that includes POC, who will be able to
unveil white transparency more easily, a juror will probably not feel
comfortable sharing over racist prejudices. Further, the onus will be on
legal players that, like in Harden, are aware of the effects of these
prejudices because they have experienced them or know people who live
through them.
The facts of Harden are illuminating in this aspect. In this case,
Harden’s counsel . . . filed a second Motion for New Trial along
with an affidavit from Juror T.H. In her affidavit, T.H., an African
American woman, stated that her “service on the jury was a very
painful, humiliating and embarrassing experience, so much so that
it has caused me not to ever again want to serve on another jury. I
feel this way because of the blatant racial stereotyping, bias, and
prejudice shown by my fellow jurors toward Mr. Harden and his
legal team.” She explained that her “fellow jurors, all of whom
were white, spoke freely in [her] presence because they thought
[she] was Latin[a] because of [her] complexion and the
pronunciation of [her] name.”
Specifically, she averred that her fellow jurors “discounted and
totally disregarded Mr. Harden’s testimony in particular and his
case in general because they believed he was a crack addict, and
158. Pena v. Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. 855, 858.
159. Id. at 858.
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that his intent was to start trouble with Officer Hillman so he could
sue the police department and get some money,” and that “[t]hey
discredited his testimony and attributed the calmness he showed
in describing the events by claiming that he was taking dope or
drinking during breaks in the trial.” T.H. further alleged that the
jurors “took verbatim what Mr. Hillman’s [white] attorney said
but described [Harden’s African American lawyer] and his team
as the ‘Cosby Show.”’ T.H. sought to remind her fellow jurors that
their job was to decide whether Hillman had used excessive force;
however, the jurors “kept saying he just wants money; he’s a crack
head; he’s an alcoholic; look at his wife, she’s nodding off; she
looks like she’s on heroin.” When T.H. explained that she was a
nurse and that Harden “wouldn’t be able to stay in the courtroom
all these hours and stay focused if he was on drugs,” members of
the jury replied, “you don’t know what he’s doing on breaks,”
which T.H. understood to indicate a belief that Harden was
“taking a swig during breaks to stay calm.” T.H. concluded: “It is
my very firm and absolute belief that Mr. Harden did not get a fair
trial because of his race and racial stereotyping. Furthermore,
there is absolutely no doubt in my mind that the race of the lawyers
was a significant factor. The jurors hung on [to Hillman’s
counsel’s] every word but gave no consideration at all to
[Harden’s counsel’s] points.”160
Apart from illustrating the credibility injustice and the indiscriminate
use of unreliable functional evidence during trials discussed, the excerpt
shows how difficult it would be for a juror to challenge the racist practices
of fellow jurors and the typical responses of such challenges to white
normativity and transparency. From the account, it can be deduced also
that if it were not for T.H.’s racially ambiguous nature, those comments
made aloud would not have been made but, nonetheless, would have been
used to decide the case. And if T.H. had not been compelled to recount her
experience, that verdict would have stood. This situation, thus, exposes the
need not to only consider overt racism in the probative system but also
other forms of racial oppression. It also supports the need for checkpoints
to mitigate the effects of racialized evidence in deliberations pre-trial,
during, and post-trial.

160. Id. 472-73 (citations omitted).
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3. Visibilizing Racial Biases & Practices
A possible solution could be to craft a different standard of review
from the one in Pena-Rodriguez that includes implicit biases. 161 Another
option could be to make the no-impeachment rule inapplicable with regard
to race. In that case, courts could conduct exit polls that assess whether
jurors impermissibly took race into account in their deliberations by asking
jurors under oath about the conduct of their fellow jurors and initiate an
investigation on the verdict motu proprio if the allegations are
meritorious. 162 That will take the onus from the parties affected and will
make the system itself accountable for enabling racist practices and
evidence. It will also serve as a way to validate non-white narratives during
trials by acknowledging their experiences with white supremacy. And,
equally importantly, it will prevent parties from harassing jurors and
frivolous attempts to find grounds to reverse a verdict while preserving the
institution of the jury.
On the other hand, we can look into ex-ante solutions to ensure that
jurors with implicit biases do not make it into a jury box. For that,
Ristiano163 and Rosales-Lopez, 164 which established a limited
constitutional application of a right to conduct a voir dire into racial
prejudices “but recognized that a non-constitutional standard could be
required in federal courts under the Supreme Court's supervisory
power,” 165 should be expanded under the Court’s supervisory power to
allow questions about racial biases in every case during voir dire.166
Legislators can also enact laws that would serve to deter the use of race in
deliberations by attaching juror liability in such cases beyond the new trial
or jury nullification remedies.

161. R. Jannell Granger, Note, Justice for All: The Sixth Amendment Mandates
Purging All Racial Prejudice from the Black Box, 63 HOW. L.J. 57, 86 (2019).
162. This could be part of jury service exit questionnaires which courts usually
provide at the end of jury duty. See Jury Service Exit Questionnaire Superior
Court of California - County of Yolo, https://www.yolo.courts.ca.gov/generalinformation/jury-services/jury-service-exit-questionnaire [https://perma.cc/NB5
G-8R9R] (last visited April 4, 2022).
163. Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589 (1976).
164. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182 (1981).
165. Nancy Lewis Alvarez, Racial Bias and the Right to an Impartial Jury: A
Standard for Allowing Voir dire Inquiry, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 959, 960 (1982).
166. See Lauren Crump, Comment, Removing Race from the Jury
Deliberation Room: The Shortcomings of Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado and How
to Address Them, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 475, 493 (2018).
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Another set of preventive measures could be, as it was suggested, to
require implicit bias training for jurors or having jury instructions that alert
jurors about impermissibly taking race into account in their deliberations
and that it would be grounds for challenging a verdict. 167 Concerns with
these measures include the efficacy of implicit bias training 168 and whether
it could be counterproductive to point out to jurors that they could be
engaging in racist practices. However, some research suggests that when
race is brought into a trial in the form of instructions, jurors tend to be
more cognizant of their implicit biases and remove them from their
deliberations as opposed to when it is not.169 This opposite reaction from
Osbourne toward Sheryl Underwood’s challenge to her defense of Morgan
could be because the implicit bias training and the jury instructions are not
an individual challenge to the racial subordinating behavior of jurors but a
general warning not to engage in it.
Such reactions from jurors suggest that it is possible to make white
normativity and transparency visible while preventing the backlash
commonly associated with their challenge. The question remains whether
the same could be achieved with legislators and the judiciary. Our legal
system should confront the racist history of the United States and reform
the rules of evidence that still bond white supremacy so that the voices and
experiences of nonwhite people are introduced in the judicial process and
validated as forms of truth.
CONCLUSION
If we were playing Jeopardy and the late Alex Trebek read the clue “A
wee bit racist,” this article has shown how our evidence system, despite its
race neutrality, would be a clear contender. Its racist history exemplified
167. Natalie A. Spiess, Comment, Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado: A Critical,
but Incomplete, Step in the Never-Ending War on Racial Bias, 95 DENV. L. REV.
809 (2018) (arguing that for Pena-Rodriguez to be a real tool in preventing the
use of race in deliberations it should be coupled with jury instructions).
168. See Timony, supra note 108.
169. See Elizabeth Ingriselli, Note, Mitigating Jurors' Racial Biases: The
Effects of Content and Timing of Jury Instructions, 124 YALE L.J. 1690, 1729-30
(2015); Samuel R. Sommers, and Phoebe C. Ellsworth, Race in the Courtroom:
Perceptions of Guilt and Dispositional Attributions., PERSONALITY AND SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY BULLETIN 26, no. 11 (November 2000): 1367–79. https://journals
.sagepub.com/doi/10.1177/0146167200263005 [https://perma.cc/Z9RJ-NUHE]
(a study suggests that whites are motivated to appear nonprejudiced when racial
issues are salient while racial issues are generally salient in the minds of Black
jurors in interracial cases with Black defendants).
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in white competency rules cannot be erased just by removing explicit
white supremacist practices. The system still operates under the premise
of white normativity, which inevitably leads to the admission of racialized
evidence while systematically excluding the possibility of impeaching
such evidence.
To counter these racist practices, this article has offered a framework
to reform the evidence rules and make white transparency visible by
looking at various points of entry during the process through three motifs
that embody CRT principles and that serve to understand racial injustice
and how to redress it. And even though the purpose of this reflection was
not to analyze in-depth possible reforms, the article has offered some
possible solutions that could be studied further, such as (1) admissibility
rules that require LSU for certain evidence and expert opinion; (2) blind
testimony; (3) jury instructions; (4) reformulations to the no-impeachment
rule, hearsay exceptions, and impeachment rules; implicit bias training; (5)
polling of jurors on the use of race in deliberations; and (6) the regulation
of functional evidence, among others.
Fixing a problem so systemic and multifaceted as racial practices in
our evidence system requires multiple efforts in addition to the ones
mentioned in the paper. 170 Yet, I hope this reflection continues to pave the
way to reform evidence rules to make them race-conscious and finally
dismantle white supremacy.

170. Other options not mentioned in the examples included that would be
worth exploring include: state-provided experts on race subordination practices
available for parties to use during trials; reinterpretation of relevancy rules to
include race even if the elements of the cause of action do not involve race; strict
professional sanctions for the use of racial stereotypes; and perhaps the
reorganization of how evidence is presented so that the race of the parties involved
is unknown until the fact-finders understand what had transpired.

